Europe, Headlines, Human Rights, Latin America & the Caribbean

Q&A: 'All Political Violence Is Not Terrorism'

Interview with Gustavo Gorriti, author of The Shining Path.

ROME, Aug 4 2008 (IPS) - Gustavo Gorriti, author of The Shining Path, which examines both the insurrection and the government's response in the internal war in Peru, has just reprinted his book. And that has raised some questions about terrorism today.

Gustavo Gorriti Credit:

Gustavo Gorriti Credit:

The Maoist group Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) became notorious for indiscriminate bombings, assassinations, brutal killings, kidnappings, bank robberies, and attacks on embassies and businesses before it was beaten in the early 1990s. The human and economic toll was devastating. Human rights groups estimate that more than 30,000 people died in violence arising from the confrontation since the rebels took up arms two decades ago. In 2003, a government commission blamed the Shining Path for about 54 percent of the violent deaths caused by the civil war.

Gorriti, a well-known senderologo (as those who studied Shining Path have come to be called), talks to IPS Editor-in-Chief Miren Gutierrez about terrorism then and now.

IPS: You published 'The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru' originally in 1990. How relevant is the book today?

Gustavo Gorriti: The book is selling well, which probably means that its subject remains important to Peruvians. After some years of self-induced amnesia, many Peruvians are trying to understand that tragic period, among other reasons because its consequences and most of its protagonists are still with us.

IPS: Reporting about the Shining Path, what have you learnt about terrorism? Is it comparable to other armed groups?


GG: Armed insurgencies have some points in common and may have significant differences. The Shining Path attempted to forcefully graft into Latin America Mao's 'People's War' insurrectionary doctrine. Yet it had some differences with its historical model in that it tried to bring the Chinese 'Cultural Revolution' into the insurrectionary equation, as well as several elements from the Komintern, an international communist organisation founded in Moscow.

At the same time, Abimael Guzmán, the Shining Path's supreme leader, studied the early Muslim conquests, to impress on his followers the importance of overriding conviction in achieving dramatic expansion and military victory.

IPS: You have said that one of the challenges then was to understand what was behind the staggering violence. Knowing about how the insurrection worked was important from the point of view of military tactics, but did it matter from an academic perspective? There is no official definition of 'terrorism', or at least there isn't one with which everybody agrees. Does motivation matter?

GG: I didn't consider then nor do I now the Shining Path's insurgency as primarily 'terrorist'. Had they been that, the threat would have been substantially lower. Obviously, they carried out many actions that could well be defined as 'terrorism', but also many others that were guerrilla or sabotage or propaganda or mostly political and administrative actions. It was then, as is now, very important not to fall into the semantic trap and describe a series of violent events with the right words and concepts.

To have a good understanding of the nature of the Shining Path, or of any other insurgency, is vital also from an 'academic perspective'. Motivation, purpose, strategy, doctrine, practice, objectives can be understood and carried out in several different ways. What would be the differences between, say, Argentina's (left-wing Peronist guerrilla group) Montoneros and the Shining Path; or between the Shining Path and El Salvador's FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, a political party formerly a guerrilla organisation)? It is pretty evident that any academic endeavour would be pointless without an understanding of the reasons and characteristics of a given insurgency.

IPS: How do you see the fight against terrorism in different places like the U.S., Spain or Colombia?

GG: The Americans have a very significant influence on the Colombian government. Not just funding but also training. The way the U.S. deals with insurgencies ('terrorism' again is too narrow a term in this case), is evolving from the colossal mistakes of the first years after the Iraq invasion to the new counter-insurgency doctrine crafted out by General David Petraeus before his Iraq assignment. That has influenced the Colombians too, but still there are important differences. The U.S. does expeditionary invasion and counterinsurgency, whereas the Colombians deal with an internal war.

In Spain, the struggle against terrorism is mainly approached as a law and order affair, to be dealt with through the police and the judiciary. From the point of view of a democracy, that is the best approach, though there are cases where that is not possible any more.

IPS: The Shining Path terrorised Peru for decades before they were beaten in the 1990s, but a March 2002 car bomb attack near the U.S. embassy in Lima summoned up old fears of terrorism. The U.S. State Department still identifies the group as a terrorist organisation. Some say that it is regrouping and recruiting new members. Does it still pose a threat?

GG: It does not represent a life or death threat to the Peruvian state as was the case in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but armed remnants are still at large. They are largely focused on the two most important coca producing regions in Peru, the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) and the Apurimac and Ene River Valleys (VRAE). They have two different leaderships that are largely hostile to each other. The UHV group has suffered several recent setbacks, while the VRAE group has been visibly strengthened in recent years.

IPS: Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori waged a violent campaign against the Shining Path. He seized near dictatorial powers in April 1992, with military support, and disbanded Peru's congress and courts, which he said were limiting his ability to fight against terrorism. You were "disappeared" during the military coup…Within a few years, Fujimori had captured most of its leaders, and terrorism subsequently declined. With the perspective of time, are there any lessons there to be learned? GG: Appearance may be deceiving in history as well as in day-to-day affairs. The central reason for the Shining Path's demise was the capture of its leader, Abimael Guzmán, 'President Gonzalo'. In terms of the 'personality cult' he by far surpassed old Mao's and even Kim Il Sung's (of North Korea). So, he was the Shining Path's greatest asset and at the same time its critical vulnerability. Until he was captured, the Shining Path was winning the war and neither Fujimori nor his advisor (Vladimiro) Montesinos had a clue about how to deal with the threat other than organising vicious but ineffective death squads.

It was a small group of policemen, the GEIN, which had been organised by the previous regime and had already dealt several crippling blows to the Shining Path, who finally captured Guzmán and changed the course of the war. That group predicated its actions on thorough knowledge of the Shining Path, very precise intelligence, and democratic values. At a time when scores of people were being killed every day, the GEIN didn't kill anybody and never shot at anybody. Yet, Fujimori was lucky enough to reap that harvest, make it appear as if victory was the result of the coup, the spy organisations and the abrogation of democracy. Many people believed and still believe that.

IPS: You have been called to testify against Fujimori in the trial for your illegal kidnapping and that of businessman Samuel Dyer in 1992. Fujimori stands accused of human rights abuses, among other crimes. What are your impressions of the trial?

GG: The trial is still going on. The tribunal will probably pass a sentence in October-November this year. Despite its sometimes frustrating formalism, it seems to be conducted rather well from a judicial perspective. At the same time, there is an almost de facto coalition between (President) Alan Garcia's Aprista government and the Fujimoristas. Perversity is not new to Peruvian politics, but this enlarges its previous borders. Will it influence the trial? Probably so. How it would, remains to be seen.

 
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