RUSSIA: Black Sea Fleet Sailing Into Uncertain Waters

By Zoltán Dujisin Reprint | | Print |

Zoltán Dujisin

PRAGUE, Mar 19 2008 (IPS) - The long-term presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukrainian territory touches a sensitive nerve in a country that is asserting its independence from Russia by seeking NATO membership.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet (RBSF) has its main base in Sevastopol, a city in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in southern Ukraine.

Many Atlanticists believe Russian military presence poses a serious obstacle to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) membership, set as a major foreign policy goal by the pro-Western elites in power since last year.

After Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union in 1992, much of the Black Sea Fleet infrastructure and personnel fell under Ukrainian jurisdiction, but conflicts immediately arose, as many officers expressed loyalty to Russia.

Moscow and Kiev decided to sign a treaty providing for joint command of the fleet, but ultimate power was always in Russian hands.

In 1997 a decision was taken to establish two separate Black Sea fleets and evenly distribute armament and infrastructure by adopting a Partition Treaty, with Ukraine leasing much of its base to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

The agreement allows for Russian troops to remain until 2017, after which Ukrainian officials in the present pro-Western cabinet say the lease won’t be renewed.

Often accusing the Russian side of obstructionism, Kiev argues that many facilities used by the Russians are not included in the 1997 basic agreement. They say this should be updated.

Tensions between the two countries have centred on the details of the lease, especially lighthouses which the Ukrainian side claims are being illegally occupied by the Russian military.

Kiev says Russians are not allowing Ukrainian officials to carry out legitimate weapon inspections of the fleet, that ecological norms are being violated, and that the Russian side is sub-letting facilities in contravention of the 1997 agreement.

There have been several decisions by Ukrainian courts ordering Russia to return the contested property to Ukraine but Russia has thus far ignored the rulings, claiming that the Basic Agreement establishes that such issues are to be decided at the inter-state level in accordance with international law.

Ukraine has also persistently called for an inventory of plots of land and real estate used by the fleet, and while the Russian side has agreed to this, no progress has been made in practical terms.

Moreover, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has said that the rental fee paid by the Russian side, estimated at about 100 million dollars a year, and which is deducted from Ukraine’s debt for Russian energy supplies, is below market value and should be raised.

Even though Moscow has persistently refused a revision of the terms of the agreement, Ukrainian media speculate that Kiev wants to double the rental amount, especially if a future inspection finds the RBSF using facilities not included in the 1997 agreement.

Russians and politicians from the Ukrainian opposition frequently reply by noting the economic benefits the RBSF brings to the city of Sevastopol and its surroundings, providing work for up to 25,000 people.

The Russian government has also aided in the construction of thousands of flats, and of a Black Sea branch of Moscow’s State University, among other educational institutions.

However, there is a symbolic and political dispute here.

Many Ukrainian citizens and politicians see the ubiquitous presence of Russian flags and other state symbols in Sevastopol as a sign of disrespect towards Ukraine’s sovereignty, prompting Ukrainian nationalists to hold periodical protest against the RBSF.

“In Crimea there is a unique situation in Ukraine; it is the only region where ethnic Russians have a majority,” Valeriy Chaly, deputy director general of the Kiev-based Razumkov Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies told IPS.

“The RBSF is playing a political, rather than military role, it is a mechanism of influence, it is more about the presence of Russian citizens in Crimea and of having influence on social issues in Sevastopol,” Chaly says.

In spite of all misgivings, defence specialists note that military-technical cooperation between the two countries has been fruitful, most of all in the aerospace industry, and many companies in the military industry have production ties to the other side.

But the presence of pro-western politicians in Ukraine’s cabinet has always coincided with calls for the Russian side to immediately start preparations for withdrawal in 2017.

Politicians favouring closer ties to Russia insist the issue should be dealt with by whatever government is in place in 2017, agreeing with Moscow in that it is too soon to take decisions.

Recent inter-state meetings have concluded with both sides calling for the matter not to be politicised any further.

“Most of the main political parties have a common position that Ukraine has to implement this agreement with Russia and then prepare the withdrawal, but there are differences in how to prepare for that decision,” Chaly told IPS.

Aware of the need to build an alternative to the base in Sevastopol, Russia says a new naval base in the Russian port Novorossiysk on the Black Sea will be completed by 2012, even though it is open to the possibility of remaining in Sevastopol if the Ukrainian side agrees to extend the lease.

The RBSF has been operating in the Black and Mediterranean Sea since the late 18th century, and holds great symbolic value in Russian history and politics.