Headlines, Human Rights, Latin America & the Caribbean

RIGHTS-PERU: Fujimori in the General’s Labyrinth

Ángel Páez

LIMA, May 10 2007 (IPS) - Testimony given by retired General Nicolás Hermoza, head of the Peruvian armed forces between 1991 and 1998, will help strengthen the case for former president Alberto Fujimori’s extradition from Chile, on charges of crimes against humanity.

Hermoza called into question the argument set forth by Fujimori’s lawyers, who allege that the former president was unaware of the activities of the Grupo Colina, a paramilitary death squad.

Fujimori, president of Peru from 1990 to 2000, is in Chile awaiting a court decision on a request for his extradition to Peru, where he is wanted for numerous counts of corruption and human rights violations.

According to Hermoza, Fujimori was fully aware of the crimes committed by the Colina group, and even congratulated the officers who headed the unit and recommended that they be promoted for their contribution to the fight against leftist insurgent groups.

“The testimony given by Hermoza, one of the most powerful men in Fujimori’s government, is a fundamental element presented by the Peruvian state to demonstrate the former president’s responsibility and argue in favour of his extradition,” prosecutor Carlos Alberto Briceño, who is involved in the cases against Fujimori, told IPS.

Hermoza, who is serving time in a Lima prison for illicit enrichment, testified before Supreme Court Justice José Luis Lecaros that Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimori’s former intelligence chief and right-hand man, had told him that the then president was familiar with the details of the Jul. 18, 1992 “disappearance” and murders of a professor and nine students at the La Cantuta University.

The La Cantuta killings came three months after Fujimori staged a “self-coup”, dissolving parliament and suspending civil liberties.

“Immediately after what happened at La Cantuta University, Montesinos informed me that members of the army had carried out a special operation that had gone beyond the orders received,” said Hermoza.

“Montesinos specifically told me that President Fujimori was already aware of what had happened,” the retired general said, according to the court document, which was seen by IPS.

Hermoza gave his testimony before Lecaros in September 2001, but it was kept secret, in order to strengthen the extradition request for Fujimori.

The former president was arrested in late 2005 when he unexpectedly flew to Chile from Japan, where he lived after his second term in office collapsed in a huge corruption scandal in 2000. (Fujimori holds dual Peruvian-Japanese citizenship).

Fujimori is now out on bail in Chile, where he is waiting for the Chilean Supreme Court to decide on Peru’s extradition request.

After the Apr. 5, 1992 “self-coup”, Montesinos and Hermoza became the most powerful men in the Fujimori regime.

Hermoza said that when he talked to Montesinos after the La Cantuta killings, the former spy chief identified by name two of the heads of the Grupo Colina. “When Montesinos informed me of what happened, he mentioned that the perpetrators were (Santiago) Martin Rivas, (Carlos) Pichilingüe (Guevara) and others,” he testified.

Martin Rivas and Pichilingüe Guevara are two of the officers whose names appear on a Jul. 30, 1991 memorandum signed by Fujimori.

In the memorandum, the then president congratulated the two captains, who were members of the Army Intelligence Service (SIE), for their participation in “special counterinsurgency operations,” and recommended that the Defence Ministry promote them to the rank of major.

Shortly after Fujimori sent the memorandum, Martin Rivas and Pichilingüe Guevara took part in the Nov. 3, 1991 massacre of 15 alleged members of the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrillas in the central Lima neighbourhood of Barrios Altos.

The victims, who included an eight-year-old boy, were at a neighbourhood barbecue when heavily-armed members of the Grupo Colina, wearing face masks, burst in and ordered everyone to lie down on the floor. They then opened fire on the group, killing 15 and seriously injuring four.

It was later reported that the assailants had been targeting a Sendero meeting, which apparently took place on another floor of the same apartment building.

The following month, the army promoted Martin Rivas and Pichilingüe Guevara.

The Fujimori regime kept mum on the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos killings, and no investigation was carried out. The public learned about the incidents from press reports.

In his statements, Hermoza told the judge that “based on my experience as a military officer and as chairman of the armed forces joint chiefs of staff,” it was impossible for “a group of such magnitude to act without the president’s knowledge.”

In court in Chile, Fujimori’s defence attorneys blamed the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos killings on members of the army, who they said had acted on their own initiative and without authorisation from the president, who allegedly knew nothing about the incidents.

The lawyers also argued that Fujimori, a former university professor, was unfamiliar with the nature of intelligence operations.

But Hermoza’s testimony directly contradicts that claim. Fujimori was not only closely in touch with the National Intelligence Service (SIN), Peru’s secret police, whose de facto chief was Montesinos, but in fact often governed from SIN headquarters.

“I am convinced that Fujimori discussed these questions (the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos killings) with the SIN leadership, since Fujimori actually slept in the SIN offices, which means he was intimately linked with the activities of that body,” said the former head of the armed forces.

Briceño said “Hermoza’s statements constitute solid evidence against Fujimori.”

According to the prosecutor, “Hermoza formed part of the structures of power, which means he knew very well what was happening on the inside, and of course his testimony completely undermines the argument set forth by Fujimori’s defence counsel,” which is “a big lie.”

Referring to the Colina unit, the retired general said that “despite having personal knowledge that military intelligence personnel were committing human right abuses, I did not discuss that issue with the president, since he never took the initiative to do so.”

“I consider that an omission on my part, although I clarify that when he (Fujimori) talked about intelligence work, he only referred to the positive aspects of that work,” he added.

In other words, Briceño told IPS, he was interested in the results, not the costs.

The prosecutor in charge of the extradition process, Omar Chehade, told IPS that a recent visit to the Chilean capital made it clear to him that the evidence of Fujimori’s “penal responsibility is so clear and compelling” that his extradition is becoming more and more likely.

“And I am not being unreasonably optimistic,” he added.

“One of the most decisive pieces of evidence is General Hermoza’s virtual accusation against Fujimori,” said the prosecutor.

“Besides, we have the memorandum in which Fujimori congratulates the paramilitary group killers, and we also have the statements of several members of Colina, which directly point to the former president,” said Chehade.