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After Bin Laden Hit, U.S. Aides Raise Dubious Hopes for Peace
Analysis by Gareth Porter*
WASHINGTON, May 8, 2011 (IPS) - Barack Obama and top administration officials have taken
advantage of the killing of Osama bin Laden to establish a new
narrative suggesting the event will pave the way for
negotiations with the Taliban for peace in Afghanistan.
That good news message, reported by Washington Post senior editor
Rajiv Chandrasekaran Tuesday, suggested that the administration would
now be able to negotiate a deal that would make it possible for the
United States to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.
The Chandrasekaran article quoted a "senior administration official"
as saying that bin Laden's death at the hands of U.S. forces
"presents an opportunity for reconciliation that didn't exist
before". The official suggested that administration officials were
seeking to "leverage the death into a spark that ignites peace
talks".
The claim of new prospects for peace conveyed to Chandrasekaran
appears to be dependent mainly on the assumption that the Taliban
leaders in Pakistan will now fear that they will be captured or
killed by the U.S. forces, as was bin Laden.
An official familiar with administration policy discussions on
Afghanistan said the fact that the United States could locate and
kill bin Laden "so deep inside Pakistan" is presumed to "have an
impact on the Taliban's thinking".
The idea that U.S. policy is now on the road to an "endgame" in
Afghanistan glosses over a central problem: the publicly expressed
U.S. determination to keep a U.S. combat presence in Afghanistan
indefinitely is not an acceptable condition to the Taliban as a basis
for negotiations.
The Chandrasekaran report anticipated the announcement soon of a
"strategic partnership agreement" between the United States and the
government of President Hamid Karzai as "another potential catalyst
for talks".
But that agreement is likely to reduce the Taliban willingness to
open negotiations with the United States rather than increase it,
because it is expected to include a provision for a long-term U.S.
military presence to conduct "counterterrorism operations" as well as
training.
None of the Taliban officials interviewed by Pakistani officials on
behalf of the United States last year said that there could be a
peace agreement in which U.S. troops would be allowed to stay in
Afghanistan.
"There is no doubt that the number one aim of the Taliban in
negotiations would be getting the U.S. States military to leave,"
said Michael Wahid Hanna, a programme officer at the Century
Foundation, who attended meetings held by a task force sponsored by
the foundation with a wide range of Taliban and former Taliban
officials in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Hanna said the signing of an agreement for a long-term U.S. military
presence in Afghanistan "would not be a helpful step" for starting
peace negotiations.
The new narrative portrays the Obama administration as sharply
divided between military and Pentagon leaders who want to maximise
the number of troops in Afghanistan for as long as possible and some
civilian advisers who want a much bigger and faster drawdown.
But that description of the policy debate on Afghanistan, which is
accurate as far as it goes, fails to make clear that the civilians in
question - including Obama himself - are not aiming at withdrawing
all U.S. forces from Afghanistan, even if there is a negotiated
agreement with the Taliban.
In an interview with 60 Minutes airing Sunday night, Obama says the
bin Laden killing "reconfirms that we can focus on Al-Qaeda, focus on
the threats to our homeland, train Afghans in a way that allows them
to stabilise their country. But we don't need to have a perpetual
footprint of the size we have now."
Obama's statement hints at his intention to continue to maintain a
much smaller military "footprint" in Afghanistan for many years to
come.
The Chandrasekaran report suggested that that the real obstacle to
beginning talks has been the unwillingness of the Taliban to renounce
its ties with Al-Qaeda.
But there is no need for more pressure on the Taliban on the issue of
its ties with Al-Qaeda, according to observers who have met with
Taliban officials.
Well before bin Laden's assassination, some senior Taliban officials
with ties to the Quetta Shura made statements to the Century
Foundation Task Force that appeared to be open to such a commitment.
"They said this can happen – something to that effect – as part of an
agreement," recalled Jeffrey Laurenti, director of foreign policy
programmes for the Century Foundation, who accompanied task force
members in those meetings.
In early December 2009, the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" - the
official name by which the Taliban identifies itself - sent out a
statement to press organisations declaring it had "no agenda of
meddling in the internal affairs of other countries and is ready to
give legal guarantees if foreign forces are withdrawn from
Afghanistan."
Although it did not explicitly mention Al-Qaeda in the statement, it
was clearly a response to the Obama administration pointing to
Taliban ties with Al-Qaeda as central to the rationale for the U.S.-
NATO war.
But the Taliban are not expected to make a declaration explicitly
naming Al-Qaeda in advance of an agreement, much less before
negotiations begin. "It makes no sense for the Taliban to concede
this point on the front end - without receiving any commensurate
concession from the other side," the Century Foundation's Hanna told
Associated Press this week.
"They portray any pre-emptive severing of ties as a type of
unilateral partial disarmament," he added.
The new narrative also suggests that the killing of bin Laden may now
reduce another obstacle to peace negotiations – Pakistani policy.
U.S. officials were said to believe that Pakistani officials had
"interfered with peace efforts in the past", but now that Pakistan is
under fire for possible complicity in bin Laden's living near the
capital for years, "have an opportunity to play a more constructive
role".
Pakistani policy has opposed peace negotiations between the Taliban
and the Afghan regime behind Pakistan's back. But contrary to the new
narrative, Pakistan has been more eager to begin peace negotiations
than the United States.
Pakistan has long complained that it was not being informed about
U.S. negotiating aims and strategy – especially with whom the United
States is willing to talk and whether it hopes to impose stiff
demands on the Taliban through military force. Speaking at the New
America Foundation Apr. 22, Pakistani Foreign Minister Salman Bashir
hinted strongly that his government disagrees with the U.S. strategy
of hoping that military pressure will yield a better settlement.
"In Islamabad we have our own assessment of the situation in
Afghanistan," said the foreign minister. "The U.S. says the momentum
of the Taliban has been halted, but is fragile and reversible. Our
own assessment is that the security situation has continued to
deteriorate."
The new Obama administration narrative seems to suggest that Pakistan
will now display a less sceptical attitude toward the U.S. diplomatic
strategy and urge the Taliban to negotiate despite the signals of
U.S. determination to keep a long-term military presence in
Afghanistan.
*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist
specialising in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition
of his latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the
Road to War in Vietnam", was published in 2006.
(END)
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