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MIDEAST: U.S. Pushing Beyond Settlement Freeze
Analysis by Jerrold Kessel and Pierre Klochendler
JERUSALEM, Sep 22, 2009 (IPS) - "Nobody can usurp the right to determine the fate of the nation on their own -
not the Palestine Liberation Organisation, nor anyone else. It is the will of the
Palestinian people that must determine our future," declares Hamas political
leader in Gaza Ismail Haniyeh.
Haniyeh was speaking Sunday at the onset of the Eid ul-Fitr holiday marking
the end of the Holy Muslim month of Ramadan.
The Hamas leader's barbs were directed against the President of the
Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas and his decision to accede to the call
of U.S. President Barack Obama to join a tripartite meeting with Israel's Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington Tuesday.
At the end of a week of shuttle diplomacy by the special presidential envoy,
Senator George Mitchell, the U.S. intermediary was unable to resolve
differences between the Israelis and Palestinians and between Israel and the
White House.
The Palestinian President found himself in a real fix. He had made plain in no
uncertain terms that he would not attend such a summit unless Netanyahu
recanted on his 'No' to a complete settlement freeze.
But after urgent consultations with Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak and
Jordan's King Abdullah II, when Obama phoned him personally to invite him
to the meeting, the Palestinian leader found himself constrained to say 'Yes'.
Going into Tuesday's summit, the Palestinian position has remained 'freeze
settlements' or 'freeze negotiations'.
Will anything make him change his mind, see the value in opening peace talks
even without the hoped-for total halt on settlement building?
That is the first of twin tests that faces the U.S. President on Tuesday - how
to entice the Palestinians to the peace table.
The second challenge is to the Israeli prime minister.
Back in May, in his inaugural White House meeting, Netanyahu was rocked by
the U.S. President's blunt attitude on settlements, and by the stark implication
that he would not stop short of pressuring Israel to do what he believed
essential to advance peace.
At first, Netanyahu seemed to take fright. He looked for any way to avoid a
showdown with the new Administration, even committing himself, albeit
reluctantly, to the principle of a two-state solution.
In the interim months, he chose to hold his ground, adroitly managing to
manoeuvre between his hard-line nationalist coalition and the insistent U.S.-
Arab demand to implement a total settlement building freeze and agreeing
only minimally to that demand.
His supporters heralded a "first-round victory on points."
The U.S. Administration has indeed - for now - fallen short of its goal to get
Israel to commit to a settlement freeze.
But, the President has repeatedly insisted that such a freeze, coupled with
stepped-up normalisation of relations between the Arab world and Israel,
was not an end in itself. It was, he indicated, but the gateway to re-starting
talks towards a comprehensive peace settlement.
"Comprehensive" has been the Obama watchword ever since in June in Cairo
he laid out his credo on how to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East
and beyond.
At this critical juncture, in advance of the new UN General Assembly session
and prior to possible talks between the six powers and Iran, "comprehensive"
means reaching way beyond the instrumental matter of a settlement freeze.
A "comprehensive" U.S. strategy now has two objectives: first and foremost,
how to deal with Iran, how to wrap the containment of Iran and its alleged
nuclear ambitions into the arena of Arab-Israeli peace-making.
Secondly, comprehensive means pursuing a Palestinian-Israeli peace full-tilt,
the substantive matter of ending the Israeli occupation, not just a settlement
freeze for its own sake.
Proof that Obama is on course for that is to be found in the nature of the last
Mitchell mission.
After his extensive talks in Jerusalem and Ramallah, sources close to the talks
acknowledge that two sets of problems remain.
The first deals obviously with the length and extent of the settlement freeze
in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. But it appears the talks did not revolve
around that alone.
Mitchell is reliably understood to have pushed the parties on still more
substantial issues that divide Israelis and Palestinians - even issues on which
they had previously agreed in prior talks - the basic configuration of the
borders between Israel and the future Palestinian state, and whether the
status of Jerusalem should be included in the upcoming round of peace talks.
Obama has already made his point on settlements. Each time a new
settlement project is announced - even in Jerusalem - comes immediate U.S.
condemnation. In other words, the U.S. has laid down an active policy
constraint - not just a demand - that is now a fact of Middle East
peacemaking.
One that Netanyahu can no longer ignore.
No settlement expansion is now a cornerstone of the U.S. Middle East
strategy - irrespective of whether Netanyahu implements a freeze, fully or
partially.
Netanyahu argues that he's ready for talks "without pre-condition". Obama
may be able to hoist him on his own petard. After all, for the President the
tripartite meeting means exactly that - the first step to full talks.
Unless Netanyahu is genuine about negotiating a two-state solution with the
Palestinians, he may soon find that his satisfaction of having survived the U.S.
pressure is short-lived.
Provided that the President can in fact get the talks going.
For their part, the Palestinians are chary about getting into another open-
ended negotiating process.
Obama's real test will be to prove to them that what the U.S. offers is not
simply another vision of peace, but a readiness for real commitment, for U.S.
engagement, and eventually, in need, for U.S. action.
The U.S. parameters on settlements, zero tolerance for further building -
whether acceptable to Netanyahu or not - are already on the table.
Now, similarly on the crucial issue of the borders between the two states,
Obama may be readying himself to define specific U.S. parameters.
That would constitute a dramatic shift in the U.S. status in the peace effort:
No longer aloof as honest broker, but a U.S. stand. So that, when the parties
struggle to reach agreement on borders, the U.S. will no longer stay on the
sidelines, but be prepared to lay down its own parameters on where those
borders ought to lie. (END)
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