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POLITICS: Will Surge Hurt US More Than Sanctions Hurt Iran?
Analysis by Trita Parsi*
WASHINGTON, Feb 26 (IPS) - The winds of fortune in the Iranian nuclear
stand-off seem to have shifted, judging by the U.S.'s new confidence. But
in Washington's apparent quest to get an upper hand, misreading the causes
of the backlash against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran may cause
the U.S. to lose rather than gain leverage.
Over the past few months, Iran's hard-line president has suffered several
political defeats at home. The most important of these were the Dec. 15
municipal elections last year where candidates allied with the president
fared miserably, while centrist conservatives close to former President
Hashemi Rafsanjani - a key rival of Ahmadinejad - made significant
gains.
Ahmadinejad's defeat, coupled with increased criticism against him at home
over his economic policies and his failure to evade U.N. Security Council
Sanctions, have left Washington with the impression that its efforts to
squeeze Iran's access to international finance has borne fruit at a
surprising rate.
Washington's euphoria over this perceived success has been used as an
argument with its European allies that the pressure is working and that if
only Europe joins the U.S., Iran will eventually be brought down to its
knees.
This argument is likely to be repeated today when the U.S., Britain,
France, Russia, China and Germany meet to discuss how to respond to Iran's
refusal to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, as requested by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1737.
But Washington's reading of developments in Iran is severely flawed. Most
importantly, there is likely no significant causality between the U.S.'s
recently imposed unilateral financial sanctions and Ahmadinejad's
dwindling popularity.
The George W. Bush administration seems to be confusing its sanctions
policies with Ahmadinejad's incompetent economic policies. The push-back
against Ahmadinejad has, according to observers of Iran's domestic
political scene, far more to do with his failed economic policies and his
populist promises, which have created exaggerated expectations among the
Iranian populace, than with Tehran's nuclear posturing or Washington's
financial sanctions.
A key trigger of the anti-Ahmadinejad sentiments has been rising
inflation, which has been caused by an influx of liquidity into the
Iranian economy rather than a shortage of it.
Still, Washington is right in pointing out that Tehran has been thrown off
course and that divisions within the Iranian government regarding the
nuclear file are growing. But the impetus for this rift is likely the
psychological shock Tehran suffered when the U.N. Security Council passed
Resolution 1737 in December of last year rather than any economic pain
resulting from Washington's pressure.
Tehran seemed to have thought that it could evade sanctions throughout
2006, and then face a potentially more lenient Council in 2007 with the
entrance of states such as South Africa into the U.N.'s highest body.
The problem for the West, though, is that Tehran will recuperate from a
psychological shock much faster than it would had the shock been economic
in nature. As a result, the West's perceived advantage over Iran may prove
transitory and short-lived.
If the Bush administration is really seeking negotiations, that is, if its
policy of seizing and releasing Iranian diplomats in Iraq and its military
build-up in the Persian Gulf are geared towards gaining leverage over Iran
to be used in a future negotiation rather than to produce a pretext to
start a war with Tehran, then Washington would be wise to start those
negotiations sooner rather than later.
Furthermore, whatever difficulties Iran may find itself in currently, and
whatever pain additional economic and financial sanctions may incur on
Tehran, these costs must be measured against Washington's intensifying
predicament in Iraq once the Bush administration's surge strategy has run
it course.
The White House is virtually alone in believing that the surge will change
Iraq for the better. Tehran is in agreement with the U.S. Congress and
Washington's European allies in predicting that the Bush administration
cannot reverse the negative trends in Iraq through a moderate increase in
U.S. troop levels, while refusing to engage Iran diplomatically or
pressure the Saudi government to clamp down on elements within its
territory who are supporting the Iraqi insurgency with funds and arms.
Still, the State Department is pressing on with its twin policy of surging
troop levels in Iraq and reducing diplomatic activity with Iran. The idea
of punishing Iran by imposing new and stricter sanctions is also
attractive to hawkish Democratic members of Congress who feel a political
need to differentiate themselves from the Bush administration and its
perceived war plans, while at the same time remaining tough and hostile
towards Iran.
By late summer 2007, however, the U.S. public's patience with the surge
policy will likely dry up. Public and Congressional opposition to the Bush
administration's Iraq policy will cross a new threshold and the White
House will be pressed to either show positive results or accept a
significant shift in its Middle East policy.
This is where the underlying flaws with Washington's faulty reading of
internal developments in Iran in which causalities are seen where none
exist may become devastating to the U.S.
If no success in Iraq has been produced by this summer, Iran will likely
be in a stronger position vis-à-vis the West than it is now, even if
Washington succeeds in imposing robust sanctions on Tehran. However
stringent the next round of U.N. sanctions on Iran may be, they will
likely not impose enough damage on Iran to offset the damage the failure
of the surge will do to the U.S.'s position.
As a result, in a bid to find leverage against Iran by increasing pressure
but without boosting diplomacy, Washington - and its European
fellow-travelers - may end up squandering the little leverage they have
left.
*Dr. Trita Parsi is the author of "Treacherous Alliances - The Secret
Dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States" (Yale University Press,
2007). He is also president of the National Iranian American Council
(http://www.niacouncil.org/).
(END/2007)
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